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Abstract
May 30-June 2, 2017, Scholarship for Service (SFS) scholars at the University of
Maryland, Baltimore County (UMBC) analyzed the security of a targeted aspect of
the UMBC computer systems. During this hands-on study, with complete access to
source code, students identified vulnerabilities, devised and implemented exploits, and
suggested mitigations. As part of a pioneering program at UMBC to extend SFS
scholarships to community colleges, the study helped initiate six students from two
nearby community colleges, who transferred to UMBC in fall 2017 to complete their
four-year degrees in computer science and information systems.
The study examined the security of a set of “NetAdmin” custom scripts that enable
UMBC faculty and staff to open the UMBC firewall to allow external access to machines
they control for research purposes. Students discovered vulnerabilities stemming from
weak architectural design, record overflow, and failure to sanitize inputs properly. For
example, they implemented a record-overflow and code-injection exploit that exfiltrated
the vital API key of the UMBC firewall.
This report summarizes student activities and findings, and reflects on lessons
learned for students, educators, and system administrators. Our students found the
collaborative experience inspirational; students and educators appreciated the authen-
tic case study; and IT administrators gained access to future employees and received
free recommendations for improving the security of their systems. We hope that other
universities can benefit from our motivational and educational strategy of teaming ed-
ucators and system administrators to engage students in active project-based learning
centering on focused questions about their university computer systems.
Keywords. Code injection, computer and network security, cybersecurity, CyberCorps:
Scholarship for Service (SFS), firewalls, NetAdmin, project-based learning, record overflow,
security evaluation, UMBC SFS Summer Research Study.
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1 Introduction
During four summer days in 2017, cybersecurity students at the University of Maryland,
Baltimore County (UMBC) analyzed the security of a targeted aspect of their university
computer systems. We report on this novel summer research study, its technical findings,
and takeaways for students, educators, and system administrators.
In fall 2016, UMBC was one of ten schools that pioneered a new strategy for attracting
talented cybersecurity professionals into government service: extend CyberCorps: Scholar-
ship for Service (SFS) scholarships to nearby partnering community colleges (CCs). There
are outstanding students at CCs, and for many of them the financial challenges of attend-
ing a four-year college full-time are daunting. With support from the National Science
Foundation (NSF), UMBC offered six students the following contract: after completing an
associate’s degree, transfer to UMBC and complete a bachelor’s degree in a cybersecurity-
related major. In return for three years of generous support (tuition, fees, health insurance,
stipend, and more) starting in the last year of CC, students work for government (federal,
state, local, or tribal) for each year of support. UMBC inducted three students from
Montgomery College (MC) and three from Prince George’s Community College (PGCC),
who all now are pursuing degrees at UMBC in computer science, computer engineering, or
information systems.
To integrate these students into the existing UMBC SFS cohort, to enhance their cy-
bersecurity knowledge and skills, and to inspire them, Alan Sherman organized a four-day
SFS Summer Research Study at UMBC for all SFS scholars at MC, PGCC, and UMBC.
Sherman also invited professors, researchers, and graduate students from UMBC, and per-
sonnel from the National Security Agency (NSA), to interact with the students as technical
experts. Everyone worked collaboratively on the same focused practical problem: analyze
the security of the NetAdmin capability of the UMBC computer systems, which through a
web interface enables UMBC faculty and staff to open the UMBC firewall to allow external
access to machines they control for research purposes. The project enjoyed strong cooper-
ation from UMBC’s Division of Information Technology (DoIT), which is responsible for
managing UMBC computer systems in support of teaching, research, and administration.
Participants were given access to all relevant source code. The students explored all as-
pects of the problem, including adversarial models, architectures, key management, use of
cryptography, authentication and key-establishment protocols, software implementations,
configurations, and policy.
By the end of the first day, the SFS scholars identified several potential vulnerabilities
and began devising exploits, working safely in a virtual copy provided by DoIT of the
actual network. Throughout and after the study, students presented their findings to DoIT
and made several recommendations for mitigating the issues they discovered. Particularly
interesting and illuminating were the end-of-day discussions between students and DoIT
staff (including the primary NetAdmin script author) during which each side shared their
perspectives on the situation, how the vulnerabilities arose, the risks they pose, how to
deal with them, and how to improve DoIT’s processes.
Although the ideas underlying the attacks are not new, the analysis of UMBC’s NetAdmin
is. More importantly, we hope that other students, educators, and system administrators
may learn from our experiences in collaborative project-based learning. All of our students
reported that the summer study inspired them and enhanced their knowledge and skills.
Students and educators appreciated the authentic case study. UMBC’s system adminis-
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trators gained access to highly qualified potential student employees (several of whom now
work for DoIT) and received free consulting on how to improve the security of their system.
There are many benefits for educators to partner with their university’s IT department to
use their university’s computing systems as a cybersecurity learning laboratory.
UMBC is a midsize public university that emphasizes science and technology. Recog-
nized as a National Center of Academic Excellence in Cyberdefense Education and Research
(CAE, CAE-R), UMBC offers undergraduate and graduate tracks in cybersecurity leading
to BS, MS, and PhD degrees in computer science and information systems, and the MPS
degree in cybersecurity. In 2017, it won first place at the National Collegiate Cyberdefense
Competition.
We assume the reader is familiar with the basics of cybersecurity, as introduced, for
example, by Kim and Soloman [KS14], Bishop [Bis03], and Sherman, et al. [SDH+17].
2 The SFS Summer Study at UMBC
This section identifies some of the key decisions we faced in organizing the summer study
and our rationale behind the choices we made.
A summer study appealed to us because it emphasized collaboration, problem solving,
and independent thinking in addressing an important, practical, challenging problem in-
volving a variety of issues. Cybersecurity is a broad discipline in which it is essential to
form teams with appropriate diverse skills and talents. Our collaborative approach res-
onated with the cohort philosophy of the SFS program. Inspiration also came from the
SCAMP summer studies organized by the Institute for Defense Analyses, in which a team
collaboratively works on one or two research problems.
We reasoned that the most effective way to initiate new SFS scholars (especially from
CCs) into UMBC’s SFS cohort was to engage them in solving a technical research problem.
We decided to remain focused on this task and not to spend any time on anything else,
such as informational presentations about UMBC.
We sought a problem that was rich and challenging, yet tractable in one week. Choosing
a problem that directly benefited the UMBC community was a major benefit, promoting
the service tenent of the SFS program. During the academic year, each SFS scholar at CC
took a special research course through which they solved IT security problems for their
county government. Analyzing the security of a focused aspect of the UMBC computer
systems offered all the elements we sought.
Focusing on custom scripts written at UMBC provided many attractive properties.
First, it was essential that the students be given all source code. There would be much
greater legal and administrative barriers to providing source code written by third par-
ties. Access to source code was important because security should not be based on the
obscurity of the NetAdmin process, and we assume that an adversary could obtain the
source code. Second, the NetAdmin scripts are short; by contrast, dealing with UMBC’s
huge commercial products (e.g., PeopleSoft) would be difficult. Third, these scripts had
never undergone any critical technical security evaluation, and the likelihood of there being
vulnerabilities seemed high.
Given the sensitive nature of problem, each participant signed a non-disclosure agree-
ment with DoIT. Students acted responsibly and responded positively to the trust bestowed
on them. For DoIT, it was easy to trust the students because they were carefully vetted
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into the SFS program, some held top-secret clearances, and any malicious behavior would
jeopardize their scholarships.
DoIT staff gave students all relevant system information—including source code, scripts,
network architectures, protocols, and configurations—and were available to answer ques-
tions about them. They also provided a virtual machine of the relevant parts of the campus
network, together with the Kali Linux suite of cybersecurity tools.
The diverse in-person participants comprised six CC transfer students, three UMBC
undergraduates, and one PhD student. The problem-solving process was entirely student
driven. Two UMBC professors and two NSA experts visited each day, to answer any
questions about technical subjects or use of tools.
The study took place from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. Tuesday through Friday in a large room
with tables, whiteboard, and projector. Basing our approach on the tenets of Project Based
Learning (PBL) [BSM+91], we presented the challenge and tasked the team to create a
structure that would achieve the desired goals of analyzing the security of NetAdmin. We
encouraged students to approach the project in any way they saw fit. Replicating authentic
scenarios of work places, our student-centered approach forced students to negotiate group
dynamics and to apply their technical skills while fully engaging in a real-life task. This
structure supported sustained inquiry and reflection.
Students self-selected into teams, each exploring some focused aspect of the problem.
For example, one team surveilled the landscape, identifying the network topology, operating
system, machines, and versions of component software. Other teams focused on architec-
tural issues, source code analysis, and known vulnerabilities of the operating system and
component software in use. More experienced students emerged as leaders.
Late each afternoon, representatives from DoIT, including the primary NetAdmin script
author, joined the group for a discussion of the day’s findings. To involve students who
were unable to attend in person (e.g., due to required internships some of which were
out-of-state), one of the students led a one-hour evening chat session on Goggle Hangouts.
PBL is an instructional approach in which small groups of students engage in authen-
tic tasks and learning occurs through their consideration of relevant problems. Students
pursue solutions by asking and revising questions, debating ideas, generating predictions,
experimenting, collecting data, drawing conclusions, communicating their ideas and find-
ings, refining approaches, and creating products [BSM+91].
PBL holds great promise in cybersecurity because there is a proliferation of complex
problems in the field and projects can support students to sustain their effort and direct
their learning. PBL supports students to develop diverse approaches to solving real-world
problems. Students are task focused and they can try out a variety of solutions and receive
timely feedback on their approaches. They engage in collaboration and reflection that
deepen their learning and enhance the transferability of skills.
There are many examples of PBL in cybersecurity (e.g., NJIT’s Cyber-RWC Summer
Camp4), though there are relatively few scholarly articles on this subject (e.g., Conklin and
White [CW05], whose graduate course includes some elements similar to our study). We
are strong believers in the value of PBL, as evidenced by our participation in the INSuRE
Project [SDC+17].
4https://sci.njit.edu/gencyber/RWCCybersecurityCampBrochure-Summer2016.pdf
4
Figure 1: Architecture of the UMBC network including the NetAdmin tool, which is ac-
cessible to machines on the research subnet.
3 The Problem
We define our research problem by describing the UMBC campus network, the origin and
use of the NetAdmin tool, our research questions, and our adversarial model. In short,
our task is to analyze the security implications of using the NetAdmin tool and to make
appropriate recommendations to DoIT.
3.1 The UMBC Campus Network
UMBC maintains a Palo Alto firewall on the network boundary that filters traffic origi-
nating from, or destined for, addresses residing outside of the campus network. All traffic
between the Internet and the UMBC network passes through the UMBC firewall. As shown
in Figure 1, the NetAdmin server is behind the UMBC firewall and is accessible from ma-
chines located on the research subnet or via certain authenticated VPN connections. The
research subnet connects faculty-operated servers and machines. All users authenticate to
the system through a single sign-on myUMBC Sibboleth service.
Defending the UMBC network is a daunting challenge. There are over 10,000 users
including over 500 faculty and staff members, some of whose credentials are lost or com-
promised on a daily basis. Over 15,000 devices connect on any given day. As a university,
UMBC must support an open and collaborative environment—much more open than would
be typically found at a commercial institution. In recent years, the main goal of attackers
seems to be to compromise of personal data. The Privacy Rights Clearinghouse estimates
that, since 2010, educational institutions have experienced 411 data breaches impacting
18.7 million identities.5
For cybersecurity, DoIT employs five full-time professionals and 13 students, of whom
four are graduate assistants. Their total annual budget for cybersecurity is approximately
$900,000.
3.2 Origin and Use of the NetAdmin Tool
DoIT created the NetAdmin tool circa 2005, primarily to automate the process of making
certain exceptions to firewall policies. Motivation for the NetAdmin tool was to provide
the protection that firewalls and intrusion-prevention systems give commercial users, while
5https://www.privacyrights.org
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enabling researchers the ability to have an open network to perform their research unen-
cumbered by network security devices. In 2006, when DoIT launched NetAdmin, UMBC
was one of the first research universities to implement a default-deny firewall policy. Typ-
ically, less than 200 machines are exempted from firewall rules by faculty and staff.
Many researchers demanded the ability to connect from the outside, including via SSH,
FTP, and HTTP, to their research machines which ran web servers and research tools.
Before NetAdmin, researchers would submit a service ticket to be handled on a case-
by-case basis by DoIT staff, imposing significant delay and requiring DoIT staff hours.
Furthermore, this manual procedure made it difficult and error-prone to monitor and audit
firewall exceptions, and to terminate these exceptions upon expiration.
The real-time automatic NetAdmin tool addressed all of these issues, allowing faculty
and staff to open the UMBC firewall to allow access from certain external systems to the
machines they control on the research subnet. The tool also greatly facilitated DoIT’s
ability to track firewall exceptions. DoIT used it extensively.
DoIT reasoned that the tool introduced little marginal risk to research machines because
machine owners could do whatever they pleased to their own machines. As the students
pointed out, however, there was risk to other UMBC systems, since the possibility loomed
that NetAdmin could introduce vulnerabilities allowing an adversary to modify the UMBC
firewall in a way that affected other machines, including machines outside of the research
subnet.
For over a decade, the tool ran untouched and seemed to work well. There were no
detected compromises, and state auditors were satisfied with the process. No one, however,
had ever subjected NetAdmin to a critical technical security evaluation. No attempt was
ever made to update or patch any of the component subsystems on which NetAdmin
depends.
Machines on the research subnet may have their own additional local firewalls, but most
do not or do not have them adequately configured. Such local firewalls might add some
additional protection in depth. Regardless, the issue of local firewalls is mostly outside the
scope of this study.
3.3 Research Questions
During the four-day research study, students focused on the following questions.
1. What potential vulnerabilities (including from design, implementation, or configura-
tion), if any, does NetAdmin introduce?
2. What potential attacks, if any, does NetAdmin enable?
3. What risks, if any, does NetAdmin introduce, especially beyond those present without
NetAdmin?
4. Can an adversary—possibly a corrupt faculty or staff member—use NetAdmin to
modify the firewall rules for any machine outside of their control?
5. Is the NetAdmin architecture appropriate for its intended purpose?
6. Does NetAdmin use appropriate cryptographic functions and does it use them ap-
propriately? Are the key lengths appropriate, and are keys managed properly?
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7. Does NetAdmin use appropriate protocols, and does it use them appropriately?
8. Is DoIT’s policy involving NetAdmin clear and appropriate?
Through discussions with DoIT in spring 2017, the study group came to a consensus
on the choice of the study topic. DoIT suggested targeting NetAdmin and they suggested
some of the initial research questions, in much the way a client might engage a cybersecurity
consultant for penetration testing. Through further discussions and over the course of the
study, students refined and augmented the initial questions.
In answering the research questions, the students could follow whatever approach they
deemed fit, using whatever tools they chose. Throughout, the study group had access to
DoIT staff who gladly provided any appropriate information requested.
The role of the study group was to advise DoIT on the facts concerning potential vul-
nerabilities, attacks, risks, and mitigations. As for the balance of risks and benefits of
NetAdmin, that was a judgement only for DoIT to make in consultation with the UMBC
administration. A compromise of computer systems or data could expose UMBC to liabil-
ities, diminshed reputation, and recovery costs.
3.4 Adversarial Model
We explain our adversarial model and trust assumptions. In summary, our primary ad-
versary is an outsider with compromised faculty or staff credentials with the knowledge,
skills, and resources of an excellent graduate student in computer science.
One way we characterize adversaries is by their level of access: (1) an outsider with
compromised UMBC faculty or staff credentials, (2) a malicious faculty or staff member
on the research subnet, and (3) a corrupt DoIT administrator.
The current situation offers no technical protection against a corrupt DoIT adminis-
trator: DoIT manages the networks, the UMBC firewall, and NetAdmin, including the
cryptographic keys and physical machines. They control and monitor the log files. Safe-
guards against corrupt system administrators depend mainly on observation, logs, and
personal trust. UMBC would, however, like to protect against Levels (1) and (2).
We also consider the adversary’s increasing level of capability: (a) a “script kiddie”
who can download and run basic malware and follow simple instructions, (b) a computer
science graduate student with access to the university’s computing resources, and (c) a
nation state. It would be impossible for UMBC to defend against a nation state, but
UMBC would like to guard against Levels (a) and (b).6
We do not consider attacks on the underlying cryptography, the physical security of
servers, nor social engineering of DoIT staff. Similarly, despite their practical importance,
we do not analyze existing procedures nor their security implications for recovery after
disaster or compromise, including of the firewall API key or NetAdmin server. We do,
however, consider whether cryptography is properly used.
The main goal of the adversary is to make unauthorized changes to the UMBC firewall
without detection. The adversary may also wish to use NetAdmin as a possible pivot for
other attacks against the UMBC network.
6With the availability of increasingly sophisticated malware (e.g., flame), defending against even script
kiddies is becoming a daunting challenge.
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4 How NetAdmin Works
Figure 2: Architecture of the “HackTest” virtual testing environment for the research
subnet.
The NetAdmin tool is a custom web application that enables an authorized user to
create and manage rules for the UMBC firewall that pertain to machines on the UMBC
research subnetwork under the researcher’s control. It is responsible for enforcing network
policies on user-created firewall rules and authenticating users during this process. Ne-
tAdmin receives firewall rules from clients and applies them to UMBC’s Palo Alto firewall
through API calls.7 Additionally, UMBC network administrators frequently use NetAdmin
to maintain and audit firewall policies for a variety of campus network services. We explain
how NetAdmin works by describing its placement and implementation, authentication and
authorization policies, user interface, interaction with the UMBC firewall, and method for
storing firewall rules.
As shown in Figure 1, NetAdmin resides on a dedicated restricted server located on the
UMBC network behind the UMBC firewall. The server is configured to allow NetAdmin
to be reachable only through connections from the campus network, including by clients
originating from authenticated VPN connections. Clients wishing to make changes to the
UMBC firewall directly in real time communicate with the server through a web browser to
create and modify firewall rules. Alternatively, a client may send a request to DoIT; if the
request is approved, a DoIT staff member would implement the request using NetAdmin.
DoIT implemented NetAdmin in PHP 5.1.6, running on a 2.2.3 Apache HTTP server.
NetAdmin recognizes several user groups including full-time faculty, staff, and network
administrator superusers. These groups are defined in a file residing in the application
directory on the NetAdmin server. NetAdmin authenticates users and tokens they submit
via UMBC’s single sign-on Shibboleth service, which is a Kerberos-like system. Superusers
may create and modify arbitrary firewall rules for any IP address on the UMBC network,
and they may view any firewall rule created by any user. Faculty and staff users may
create and modify some firewall rules for certain common ports associated with their own
network address.
Users specify firewall policies through a web-interface wherein the user’s browser sends
web forms defining firewall rules to the NetAdmin server. A faculty or staff user may create,
modify, or delete certain rules for any IP address they own. Rules that specify ports to
open must reference ports on a list for commonly used services—for example, SSH (22),
HTTP (80), HTTPS (443), and DNS (53). Proposed rules violating these restrictions must
be submitted out-of-band to DoIT for special consideration. After one year, rules expire
7Application Programming Interface (API)
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and are marked “inactive,” regardless of use. Users may activate, deactivate, or renew
their rules through NetAdmin.
Through API calls invoked by Perl scripts, NetAdmin pushes rules to the UMBC fire-
wall, which is physically and logically separated from NetAdmin. The firewall authenticates
API calls using a 360-bit symmetric API key stored in a file on the application directory
of the NetAdmin server. The file is neither digitally signed nor hashed.
NetAdmin stores firewall rules and logs in unstructured files on the NetAdmin server.
The rules file helps preserve state through failures and restarts. In this file, each rule is
described by one record. Newline characters delimit records, and pipe characters delimit
fields within any record.
Figure 2 shows the architecture of the virtual testing environment, called HackTest,
used in the study. This environment includes guest UMBC accounts and allows access to
all communications between the UMBC firewall and the NetAdmin server.
5 Potential Vulnerabilities, Attacks, and Risks
Our initial efforts focused on identifying potential vulnerabilities, which we now summarize.
We also identify potential attacks that exploit these vulnerabilities and discuss associated
risks.
5.1 Potential Vulnerabilities
1. The network architecture, and its use of a single firewall for the entire campus
network, does not provide a segmented layer of defense for the research subnet.
NetAdmin implements a capability that is supposed to affect only the research subnet.
However, if an attacker could compromise NetAdmin, then there is no architectural
protection that would limit the attacker’s ability to affect the entire campus network.
2. The NetAdmin server runs on an unpatched, out-of-date operating system (OS)—
CentOS 5.11—using Linux kernel (2.6.18), which is known to have at least 451 vul-
nerabilities.8 As of March 2017, CentOS 5.11 is no longer supported.9 Compromise
of the NetAdmin server could result in complete security failure of NetAdmin’s fire-
wall change process, allowing an attacker to issue arbitrary firewall rules, modify log
files, and exfiltrate the firewall API key.
3. NetAdmin authenticates the firewall (using a self-signed certificate), but the firewall
does not authenticate NetAdmin. The firewall checks only that forms purportedly
from NetAdmin have the firewall API key. Anyone with the firewall API key could
issue arbitrary firewall rules.
4. All communications between users and the NetAdmin server use unencrypted HTTP
without integrity protection, allowing an adversary to read and modify traffic and to
carry out possible man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks. The user’s browser sends Ne-
tAdmin rule changes via web forms, which the browser authenticates using UMBC’s
Shibboleth service. By modifying the web forms sent from the user to the server, an
8https://www.cvedetails.com
9https://wiki.centos.org/FAQ/General#head-fe8a0be91ee3e7dea812e8694491e1dde5b75e6d
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adversary can cause NetAdmin to implement firewall rules that enable unauthorized
access to the user’s machines.
5. If an adversary could hijack an authorized user’s entire session when the user logs
into myUMBC, then they could masquerade as the user to NetAdmin.
6. While communications between the NetAdmin server and the firewall are protected
by HTTPS, there seems to be an opportunity for a possible additional MitM attack on
the initial communication that exchanges the self-signed authentication certificates
7. Because NetAdmin authenticates the firewall using a self-signed certificate, compro-
mise of UMBC’s key used to sign certificates would enable an adversary to forge
certificates.
8. Committing some of the most common software security errors (see Kaza [KTH15]),
NetAdmin does not adequately check and sanitize inputs and form fields, allowing
the possibility of attacks that inject code and/or manipulate form field data.
9. NetAdmin permits firewall rules to include HTML and JavaScript descriptions, allow-
ing possible code injection attacks [OWA]. For example, such injections might permit
the execution of arbitrary code in the browser of a user or system administrator using
NetAdmin.
10. NetAdmin does not check the length of firewall rule descriptions, allowing possible
record-overflow attacks and/or denial-of-service attacks (DoS). In particular, NetAd-
min’s use of the PHP command fgetcsv() assumes that each record is at most 999
bytes long. The source code does not verify this assumption, with the unintended
result that any bytes following any 999-byte record will be treated as a new record.
11. Violating the principle of least privilege [Bis03], NetAdmin uses a firewall API key
with more permissions than are needed: this key permits arbitrary changes to the
firewall.
12. NetAdmin stores critical information, including the firewall API key and log files,
rules, in unstructured plaintext files on the NetAdmin server. The file is relatively
easy to exfiltrate and is stored unencrypted. The integrity of the file is not protected.
13. NetAdmin permits VPN access via the UMBC network, facilitating remote attacks.
5.2 Potential Attacks
A variety of potential attacks are possible that exploit the identified vulnerabilities. We
list a few examples. Combinations of these attacks are also possible. Because NetAdmin
allows VPN connections via the campus network, adversaries can mount many of these
attacks remotely. To demonstrate the feasibility of these attacks, students implemented a
record-overflow and injection attack.
1. (record overflow) An authorized user (or an adversary with compromised credentials
of an authorized user) enters a long malicious rule that causes NetAdmin to imple-
ment an arbitrary rule for the UMBC firewall affecting any machine. Failure to check
10
field lengths in user inputs results in NetAdmin accepting data beginning with byte
1000 as a new and valid firewall rule. See Figure 3.
2. (injection attack) Similar to the record-overflow attack, but the payload is a firewall
rule with malicious HTML and/or JavaScript. Victims can include users and ad-
ministrators. The JavaScript can submit arbitrary rules to NetAdmin without the
user knowing. It can submit rules via AJAX, and then when viewing the rules, sim-
ply delete that row from the HTML table, so the user never notices. Alternatively,
this attack might cause the web front-end to steal credentials or trick the victim to
perform actions they do not wish to perform. The malicious code can also execute
arbitrary commands on the NetAdmin server, for example, exfiltrating the firewall
API key.
3. (server attack) Exploiting known vulnerabilities of the Linux kernel version 2.6.18,
the adversary learns the firewall API key and executes arbitrary commands on the
NetAdmin server.
4. (network attack) Because the communications between users and NetAdmin are not
protected for confidentiality or integrity, a passive adversary can monitor all such
communications. An active adversary can modify messages to implement firewall
rules affecting the user’s machine or to launch an injection or record-overflow attack
described above. For example, an adversary can mutate form fields to submit firewall
rules that do not correspond to IP addresses for which they are authorized.
5. (MitM session hijacking) An adversary on the research subnet can attempt to hijack
an authorized user’s entire session as the user logs into myUMBC. For example,
the adversary might try to do so by redirecting the user’s traffic to the adversary’s
machine using ARP poisoning or by posting a fake access point. Easily available
malware, such as SSL Strip, might faciliate such an attack.10 Thereby, the adversary
might be able to obtain a cookie that the adversary could use to authenticate to
NetAdmin and to other UMBC services.
6. (MitM attack during initial key establishment) A sophisticated MitM attack between
NetAdmin and the firewall can likely intercept the the firewall API key and cause
NetAdmin to accept an erroneous public-key certificate of the firewall. This attack
requires access at the crucial key-establishment time.
5.3 Potential Risks
The attacks listed above are feasible and well within the capabilities of computer science
graduate students. The adversary could learn the firewall API key, from which the adver-
sary could implement arbitrary rules on the UMBC firewall. Thus, the adversary could
open any port for any machine on the UMBC firewall. By opening ports, the adver-
sary might move throughout the campus network, exfiltrate data, steal credentials, steal
intellectual property, sabotage research, disrupt services, and launch DOS attacks. By
manipulating log files on NetAdmin, the adversary could try to remain unnoticed.
10https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-dc-09/Marlinspike/BlackHat-DC-09-Marlinspike-Defeating-SSL.
pdf
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Figure 3: Screenshot of NetAdmin web interface with record overflow.
The UMBC network is under constant attack. DoIT believes that most of the current
attacks aim to steal personal information, including credit card numbers. DoIT is not
aware of any attack having been mounted on NetAdmin. Perhaps this situation reflects
that no adversary bothered to explore possible vulnerabilities in NetAdmin and that there
may be other more attractive avenues of attack.
6 Recommendations
To address the potential vulnerabilities, attacks, and risks identified in Section 5, the
students recommend that DoIT carry out the following mitigations and additional actions.
6.1 Recommended Mitigations
1. (keep software up-to-date) The NetAdmin server should run a well-patched and main-
tained operating system. For example, replace CentOS 5.11 (which is deprecated)
with the most recent version (CentOS 7 as of March 2018). All software used by
NetAdmin, particularly the Apache HTTP server, PHP engine, and Perl interpreter,
should be up-to-date. Doing so reduces the ability of an adversary from using easily
available known attacks.
2. (sanitize inputs) Sanitize all form inputs on the server side. Special characters, partic-
ularly the pipe character used to delimit records in the data file, should be prohibited
in firewall rule descriptions. Form fields should not accept HTML or Javascript val-
ues.
3. (check IP addresses) For non-superusers, the server should ensure that the IP address
of a firewall rule corresponds to the IP address of the user. Although an adversary
might be able to spoof her IP address, it would be prudent to add this check.
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4. (check record sizes) In firewall rules, enforce maximum sizes for fields including server
names and rule descriptions. For example, one might impose a 128-byte limit on
server names and a 256-byte limit on rule descriptions. Doing so prevents an adver-
sary from mounting record-overflow attacks to create arbitrary firewall rules. Read
data files in such a way that records larger than 999 bytes are rejected, or truncated,
rather than interpreted as multiple records.
5. (encrypt communications) To protect confidentiality and integrity, communications
between the NetAdmin server and NetAdmin users should use end-to-end encryption
with authentication and integrity protection, such as that offered by implementations
of OpenSSL.
6. (limit capabilities of firewall API key) Limit the capabilities of the API key used to
communicate with the UMBC firewall so that it can only create, modify, and delete
firewall rules pertinent to the UMBC research subnet. Different API keys should be
used for pushing firewall rules defined by users versus pushing firewall rules defined
by superusers.
7. (improve key management) The Firewall and NetAdmin each should have a certificate
signed by a trusted third party. Each machine should authenticate the other. Improve
the initial establishment and storage of the firewall API key by NetAdmin. Use a
key-establishment protocol that is not vulnerable to MitM attack. Do not store the
API key in plaintext in an unprotected file. Consider using a TPM.11 Some database
products might provide some degree of protection for key storage.
8. (deny VPN access to NetAdmin) Require all connections to NetAdmin to originate
from campus, as enforced in part through physical network connections to the NetAd-
min server. To reduce the risk of remote attacks, VPN access to NetAdmin should
be denied. Doing so, however, would still allow the possibility of a user connecting
to NetAdmin indirectly after remotely connecting to another campus machine, an
unfortunate reality that would be hard to prevent.
9. (segment NetAdmin) For defense-in-depth, segment NetAdmin into two services: a
web front-end, and a back-end that communicates with the firewall. The front-end
accepts input, validates whom it came from, sanitizes it, and passes it to the back-end.
The back-end performs additional validation and sends instructions to the firewall.
Only the second service is permitted to read sensitive data (e.g., firewall API key).
The services should run under separate accounts. The front-end should be unable to
run shell scripts, and the back-end should be permitted to communicate only with
the front-end and the firewall.
6.2 Additional Recommendations
1. (deploy a segmented architecture) To limit the possible scope of failures in NetAdmin,
deploy a segmented architecture as shown in Figure 4, so that the architecture will
prevent NetAdmin from affecting any machine outside of the research subnet.
11Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
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Figure 4: Recommended architecture to provide compartmentalized defense, architec-
turally limiting the scope of NetAdmin functionality to the research subnet.
2. (physically secure NetAdmin and firewall in same room) Improve the security of the
connection between NetAdmin and the proposed separate firewall by placing both
machines in the same physically-secure room physically connected by a dedicated sub-
net. Enforce this architecture in part through physical network connections between
the NetAdmin server and the proposed separate firewall for the research subnet.
3. (conduct technical security audits) In addition to periodic administrative audits,
DoIT should also commission technical security audits carried out by qualified inde-
pendent cybersecurity consultants.
7 Discussion
We now discuss a number of issues raised by our experiences, including vulnerabilities
discovered, takeaways for study organizers, UMBC’s extension of SFS scholarships to two
community colleges, and reflections from a UMBC system administrator.
7.1 Observations on Vulnerabilities Discovered
Our case study exposes why certain common vulnerabilities arose and the costs and com-
plexities needed to avoid or mitigate these vulnerabilities. For example, the NetAdmin
server ran an obsolete and unpatched OS partly because DoIT did not invest the staff
resources to keep the system current. DoIT feared that updates to the OS might break
the custom system, requiring more staff time to fix. There is no escaping the harsh reality
that maintaining a secure system demands considerable ongoing attention and resources,
and any changes to the system (including ones mitigating known vulnerabilities) also risk
the possibly of introducing new vulnerabilities.
7.2 Takeaways for Study Organizers
Overall the study went very smoothly. Project-based learning sustained inquiry and critical
thinking. The virtual environment enabled the students to work on an essentially identical
copy of the network environment without interfering with the actual network. The evening
chat sessions provided a way for students to participate, even if they could not attend
the regular session. We found that chat worked better than video conferencing because it
created a written record and it more easily enabled students to enter the session late. Using
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the study room’s data projector and whiteboard facilitated discussions. Throughout each
day, the group posed questions to DoIT and received written answers via a GoogleDoc.
Talking with the developer was very useful. The study room could have benefited from
more electrical outlets and power strips.
Participants completed surveys at the end of the summer project in which they all
reported that the project increased their cybersecurity knowledge and skills (86% responded
strongly agree, 14% responded agree). Participants identified the following elements as
valuable: teamwork, hands-on nature of the task, real-world challenge, critical thinking,
and problem solving. All participants reported that they would recommend the summer
study project to other cybersecurity students.
At UMBC we were fortunate to enjoy strong support and cooperation from DoIT.
Some other schools, however, might face a defensive administration fearing embarrassment
or unwilling to trust students with sensitive system security information. We commend
UMBC’s DoIT for their constructive attitude, which through encouraging analysis of their
systems, helps them enhance the security of their operations. Most SFS students are highly
trustworthy: schools select SFS students carefully, and the students are expected to be able
to attain at least a secret clearance (many hold top-secret clearances).
Our choice to schedule the study in early summer immediately after commencement
created a conflict with several students who were starting required summer internships. To
avoid such conflicts, this year we held the study in January, the week before classes resume.
While better for most students, this new schedule created conflicts with some students who
took classes in January.
7.3 Extending SFS Scholarships to Community Colleges
So far, the new venture to extend SFS scholarships to community colleges appears to be
working well. We are attracting highly-qualified students, and for some students from mod-
est backgrounds, the scholarship is a life-changing opportunity. There is an opportunity
cost in that, given finite budgets, a scholarship awarded to a CC student who transfers to
UMBC is a scholarship not awarded to a non-transfer student at UMBC. Awarding one
SFS scholarship to each of two CCs per year seems like an appropriate balance for UMBC.
Among CC students, we restrict our attention to CC students pursing Associate’s (AS)
degrees who intend to transfer to a four-year school. UMBC’s articulation agreement with
Maryland CCs ensures that any student who earns an AS degree at any Maryland CC
with GPA of at least 3.0 will be admitted to UMBC. There remains the issue, however,
that many CCs target their cybersecurity courses at Associate of Applied Science (AAS)
students who intend to enter the workforce after two years at CC. Typically, the AAS
students are not prepared to transfer to four-year schools, and often AS students have
limited available time to take many cybersecurity courses.
7.4 Reflections from a UMBC System Administrator
Jack Suess, Vice President of Information Technology and Chief Information Officer (CIO)
at UMBC, remarks:
As the CIO and a former student IT employee (1979–81), I greatly value this
experience for our staff and students. For staff, we are forced to move out of
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our imagined protective bubble and look at the consequences of our decisions if
we have a motivated and highly skilled attacker. In this case we can “imagine”
that no one will ever take the effort to dig deep enough to find our flaws; when
the students unmask these flaws, it shows that we need to be more conscious of
flaws! For students, they are able to leave the academic bubble of the theoretical
and operate in the real world of people writing code that needs to be secure and
to think about what can go wrong. This effort will make those who program
much better at thinking about security from the beginning of their design. As
a CIO, I love that we have repeated this exercise with the SFS scholars and, in
both exercises, we gained valuable feedback that improved the security of our
services for free!
8 Conclusion
In only four days, SFS scholars in the UMBC summer study identified significant security
vulnerabilities with UMBC’s NetAdmin system that enables faculty and staff to open
the UMBC firewall for machines they control on the research subnet. These vulnerabilities
include unpatched systems, record overflow, uncompartmentalized architecture, and failure
to sanitize inputs. Students also suggested mitigations. The details provide an instructive
authentic case study in cybersecurity.
As evidenced by responses from the student exit questionnaire, the experience engaged
and motivated students. The participants who had transitioned from community colleges
demonstrated that there are highly capable students at community colleges who can con-
tribute to our nation through cybersecurity.
The study illustrated advantages that can arise when educators partner with univer-
sity system administrators to allow qualified students to use the university’s computer
systems as a learning laboratory. Students gained exciting, concrete, hands-on collabo-
rative experience. Educators were given a rich and inspiring detailed realistic case study
to support project-based learning. The university’s system administrators received a free
cybersecurity consultation and hired several of the SFS scholars to join their security team.
We look forward to continuing the research study experience each year, and we hope
that other schools can also benefit from such collaborations.
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A Acronyms and Abbreviations
API Application Programming Interface
AS Associate of Science
AAS Associate of Applied Science
CAE National Center of Academic Excellence
CC Community College
CCDC National Collegiate Cyberdefense Competition
DoD Department of Defense
DoIT UMBC Department of Information Technology
GPA Grade Point Average
IASP DoD Information Assurance Scholarship Program
INSuRE Information Security Research and Education collaborative
IT Information Technology
MC Montgomery College
MitM Man-in-the-Middle
NJIT Cyber-RWC New Jersey Institute of Technology Cybersecurity Real World Connections
NSA National Security Agency
NSF National Science Foundation
OS Operating System
PBL Project-Based Learning
PGCC Prince George’s Community College
SCAMP Summer Conference on Applied Mathematical Problems
SFS CyberCorps: Scholarship for Service
TPM Trusted Platform Module
UMBC University of Maryland, Baltimore County
VPN Virtual Private Network
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